Secularism, Unbelief, and Rationality Part 2

I'd like to start out by saying that I think my previous post rambled a bit more than it ought, for which I apologize to my readers. This issue (why is God's existence not obvious?) is a rather difficult question, and I struggled my way through that last post. I did mention, though, that I would attempt to provide my own answer to this question: how is it that the existence of God is so 'non-obvious' when God is the Creator of the world and the world was created to reveal God to humanity?

Well, here is my first stab at explaining this phenomenon. In line with my last post, I will be keeping "in-house" Christian language to a minimum.

To begin, we have to spend some time clearing a little conceptual ground which relates to whether Christianity is a natural or obvious belief structure. Charles Taylor notes in ch. 14 of A Secular Age that it took some time for unbelief/atheism to become an intellectually viable position. Taylor's point is an important one: it is hard to disbelieve when such a conceptual option is culturally unavailable. Not impossible, perhaps, but rare. Again, we ought to keep this idea in mind when we try to understand the decline of faith in our age. However, setting our discussion up in these terms may be misleading. For many in Western culture, Christendom or the Western medieval model of a totally pervasive Christian culture is what they think of when they think of the default position of Christianity. I think, however, that we need to remember that Christendom was not and is not the default position. That is, Christianity has not operated always and everywhere as a totally pervasive, solitary conceptual option for its adherents.

Rather, Christianity began in the Roman Mediterranean as one seriously implausible account of the world among other accounts. Early Christians did not proclaim a message of truth which won converts due to the clarity or, for lack of a better term, "obviousness" of its message. What I mean to say is that Christian proclamation did not result in a bunch of people slapping their foreheads and responding with an, "Of course, that's how the world works! Why, I knew that all along!"

You might be wondering why I bring this point up or if I'm even addressing the original question. What I'm trying to do is start out by saying that, from a Christian perspective, the Christian perspective has not historically been the only conceptual option for those who hear it, and it is admittedly not an immediately obvious position. In other words, though we Christians think the Christian perspective is the true perspective, we are (or ought to be) quite aware of its difficulties, and, historically, we have been since the beginning. The New Testament speaks of Christian proclamation as a "mystery," as something "offensive" and "veiled." This emphasis is not isolated simply in the beginning, either. Even in the High Middle Ages, during Christendom par excellence, Thomas Aquinas could note that reason would never establish or arrive at the conclusion of Christian truth in the events of redemption. Reason could only defend the possibility of its truth-value and defend against charges of irrationality.

To continue my answer, I believe our problem lies in a fairly specific area. We tend to think that the truth of God's existence ought to be obvious, mostly because we often think of truth as something obvious or immediately apparent. We rely on the idea that we understand truth with our minds in the same way that we see objects with our eyes. In this model, "facts" are discovered in a manner not unlike noticing the color of the sky or the proximity of some obstacle. So, we think a truth statement like "God exists" is epistemologically equivalent to "The sky is blue."

However, I think, upon further reflection, that we could admit that the truth is not always obvious, even if it is a "determinative" or "high-impact" truth which affects all our other ideas. There are many examples I could use, but let me point out one fairly easy one. We all agree that the earth rotates around the sun. Why? Is that an obvious truth? If one were to step outside and observe the sun with the naked eye for years, would the conclusion that the earth rotates around the sun be reached? I think we can all admit that, in most cases, this conclusion would not be reached by anyone who watches the "sunrise" and the "sunset" every day. However, I doubt that any of us finds it necessary to object against this truth.

I use this example to demonstrate that something can be clearly true in one sense, i.e. we all accept the idea, and it helps to organize a whole load of other ideas. At the same time, it is not manifestly true, i.e. most of us could not prove it, it took years upon years for this view to pervade our culture, and it does not match up to all of our direct experiences.

I hope this example shows you where I am heading. Namely, I want this illustration to point out that ideas which are true do not need to be obvious or easily reached in order to be true. We accept this idea when it comes to our example above. So, the next question has to be: why do we expect truth concerning God to be more easily reached? That is, why should we discover that God exists in a manner simpler than that involved in discovering an observable fact about the physical universe?

Now, I could make another point in this direction, and I will note it briefly before continuing on to my next main point. First, we should note that observable facts about the universe like knowing the earth rotates around the sun or noticing the someone's hair is red are actually facts which require a great deal of training to notice. For example, one must be taught that "red" denotes a particular observable phenomenon which occurs on the surface of various objects and then realize that the type of "red" which we apply to red brick is somehow related to the "redness" of someone's hair. For the other example, we can see that observable facts of a scientific kind actually require particular theories and methods to be internalized before they can be reached. Once reached, though, they can be disseminated to a more general population rather easily, despite the fact that the general population could not arrive at such conclusions on their own. Follow this line of thought and then ask why the existence of God should be something easy to discover without the internalization of a particular framework.

What I would like to note at this point is the objection that I would imagine many of you are now harboring in your mind. It is likely offensive to you that God's existence should be difficult to ascertain, that it should be as difficult as the discovery that the earth rotates around the sun. Isn't that a little curious? Why should you think that unless you are engaged in speculation concerning the characteristics which God ought to have and how he ought to behave? I have to note something that Pascal also noted so many years ago. He noted, similarly to what I stated above, that ascertaining God's existence is difficult. There is enough evidence to lead the religious seeker eventually to discover the truth of God's existence but there is not enough evidence to guarantee that outcome. When he faced objections from those who did not believe, Pascal pointed out that their objections were rather ridiculous. How could they, who ostensibly do not believe in God, wish to dictate the terms under which God would reveal himself to human beings? By engaging in such debate, the unbeliever has now become one who asks religious questions, i.e. a religious seeker.

But perhaps I am now simply being clever? Please object if I am, for I will admit that I am trying to be somewhat provocative. I am arguing that the existence of God need not be more obvious to any of us than any other truth. It is capable of being denied or affirmed in many of the same ways. It could not be a truth apprehended by human beings if it were any different.

This specter of difficulty, though, can be handled in a couple ways. First of all, if knowledge of God's existence is analogous to other types of knowledge, then people actually can discover it. That discovery of the truth might be difficult, take time and patience, and test our devotion to the question to the uttermost leads us in a rather different direction. Second, though, knowledge of God need not be difficult. Rather like our example above, once something is known and disseminated throughout society, it is no longer necessary for every person to go through the same arduous process to discover it. Clearly, not very many of us need to rediscover the heliocentric model. So, truth can now be apprehended through much easier channels, which deal more with the issues of warrant for belief, trust in sources, and faith in the truthfulness of other person's testimony.

Now, of course, we have opened the door to all sorts of different questions which I have not addressed here in order to keep the discussion from becoming merely "in-house." Yet these questions are actually theological or metaphysical questions. By considering this issue concerning how human beings discover truth, using terms which are common to both Christians and others, we can arrive at a place where we are not simply discussing whether it is difficult to believe in God, but whether it is appropriate that belief in God is so difficult and whether God ought to have behaved differently. We are in a different realm altogether from where we started.

Secularism, Unbelief, and Rationality

Here's a rather amusing statement I found as I was considering how to start writing this evening: "God’s truth will not come to your front doorstep like an unordered Domino’s pizza" (http://www.scottmsullivan.com/courses/Pascal.pdf).

What Mr. Sullivan brings to our attention is the concept of the "hidden God," that God's truth is not immediately evident to the believer or unbeliever. For some reason, conceiving of God is not an immediate idea. I was drawn to discuss this problem because of a recent chapter from Charles Taylor's A Secular Age sent to me by my good friend, one Mr. Alfredo Garcia. At one point, Taylor notes, "In the seventeenth century, you had to be a Pascal" to appreciate the concept of a hidden God (532). Yet, I would note that at another point in Western society, it was almost impossible to be an atheist; it was held to be rationally inconceivable or at least rarely conceivable. I was drawn by Taylor's statement to an earlier example of the discussion on the possibility or rationality of unbelief, that famous discussion of Anselm and Gaunilo which highlighted what was later labelled the ontological argument for God's existence.

Perhaps my gentle readers are familiar with the argument? There are various ways to phrase it succinctly, but it goes something like this:

1. Everyone can conceive of God.
2. Therefore, God exists in the understanding.
3. When God is conceived/exists in the understanding, he is conceived of as that than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.
4. If that than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists in the understanding, but does not exist in reality, then a greater being can be conceived.
5. Hence, that than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conveived exists (i.e. God exists).

What is often not mentioned in connection with this argument is that the discussion in Anselm's Proslogion and Gaunilo's Response in Defense of the Fool is, shall we say, purely academic or "in-house!" We have an abbot (later bishop) and a monk from another monastery, both believing in God, who are discussing whether it might be rational not to believe in God. Anselm says no. Gaunilo emphatically responds with a yes. Yet it remains an in-house argument, a consideration to be puzzled over in a society largely Christian.

Whatever we think of the ontological argument, the discussion between Anselm and Gaunilo gives a starting point for a rather interesting development. In the eleventh century, we have two persons discussing whether it might be rational not to believe in God. We might posit alongside this in-house example a more common occurrence in the twentieth century, i.e., a coffee-house discussion of whether it might be rational to believe in God. Somewhere in between we have Pascal and the intellectual elites of the seventeenth century, who were displaying the beginnings of trend towards viewing belief as difficult to attain. At some point, though, it become possible, even more easily defensible, to be take up a position of unbelief. How is this possible, and is it acceptable for the Christian?

Now, Taylor gives a variety of possible explanations as to why this might have developed and why the "secular" option is so prevalent today. He believes it took some time for a position of atheism to be intellectually viable in the most basic sense. Also, Christianity was so intertwined with society, it took a little while to develop a relatively coherent account of society and the world which did not require the explanation of God. However, it is fairly easy to see that, once it settled in our society, secularism became not only the dominant model for atheists, but also the model for Christians.

I'm sure you can imagine why I might have wanted to discuss this question. But I also find myself wanting to address this theme because a blog I follow recently noted "the utterly dominant success of the secular model," and how "the believer and non-believer experience the world in much the same manner" (see http://fatherstephen.wordpress.com/2010/06/10/the-crisis-of-religion/). Fr. Stephen goes on to say several things in response to these ideas, some of which I will repeat here. For the Christian, the whole of creation must be considered an Epiphany of the glory of God. No neutral ground, no inert matter exists which can be considered apart from this role. The secular model, which takes the non-existence of God (or His irrelevance to most questions) as a starting principle, does not work for a Christian looking out upon the world.

To use an analogous concept and to move from an Orthodox voice to a Protestant systematic voice, we might say that there is no man who can be considered in himself ; there is only man for whom Christ died and rose again (see Barth, Church Dogmatics I. 2; and, yes, I realize I "masculinized" the human race in that paraphrase, my HDS comrades).

Yet, I imagine it seems problematic to make this statement. After all, did we not just concede that, for many people, the existence of God can barely be admitted as a rational possibility? How then can we make a mere possibility into the determining factor for the rest of our conceptions? I know that this move appears problematic to me, and I am the one making it! I will begin by noting some popular answers we might give.

For Fr. Stephen and for Pascal, the hiddenness or apparent absence of God from the world actually creates the space wherein we might trust and love God. God is not so immediately present to us that we are forced to love and trust in Him. Yet, in some way, God draws us to Himself through the hiddenness; God brings to birth within us the faith and love with which we trust and obey Him.

This is a fine "in-house" answer, a simple one, a theological one which I might give in a discussion with other Christians. Some would say that this statement is as far as we can go and that we have no burden to demonstrate to those outside the rationality or coherence of our faith in God and the perpspective which follows from faith.

For others, they might point to something like spiritual blindness. Actually, God is visible through the created order, and the only reason that unbelievers cannot see this point is because they engage in a variety of self-delusional strategies, some simple and some complex, some conscious and others unconscious, all because they actually don't want to believe in God. Various reasons might be given: perhaps some unbelievers dislike the ethical demands of the Christian life, perhaps they dislike the ethical slovenliness of Christians in meeting those demands, perhaps, perhaps, perhaps. This also, is fairly "in-house," though it can be better shown to cohere with certain contemporary philosophical and psychological discussions (see Kevin Kinghorn's The Decision of Faith). But how might I actually explain in common terms to one outside the Christian faith, why it is that God is hidden or appears absent?

I know that I have a couple ways I might try to answer the question myself, which I will post in a few days. But I'm curious what my readers might think. How do they conceive of the problem? Is it possible for a believer and an unbeliever to explain this problem in terms the other would accept?